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Mistake Library

The archive of the most common mistakes, with the typical consequence and a link to the page explaining how to avoid them.

Educational use. This view supports study, familiarisation and preparation. It does not certify competence or compliance and does not replace the SMS, approved procedures or documents, authority decisions, or verification of current sources. If content differs, the linked topic governs.
TopicMistakeTypical consequencePage
PSC documentary preparation — passenger / ro-ro shipUsing Annex IV as an identical list for every shipConfuses inclusion in the Annex with applicability to the shipView page →
TMSA: the Company's self-assessment, not the ship'sLevel declared from a procedure alone, without cumulative criteria and operational evidenceMaturity overstated against implementationView page →
CDI-M: the Ship Inspection Report for chemical tankers, gas carriers and beyondWrong inspection typeIrrelevant scopeView page →
IOPP Certificate: the Supplement is the document that mattersChecking only expiry, using an outdated supplement or assuming a domestic ship is outside MARPOL.Check the individual ship’s requirements and documents before closing the work.View page →
Oil Record Book — Part I (Machinery Space Operations)Operation not signed by the officer in charge, or completed page not signed by the MasterPSC deficiency, possible detentionView page →
Sludge ManagementSludge balance with a large, unexplained varianceSuspicion of illegal discharge, in-depth investigationView page →
Bilge WaterAvoid confusing testing with calibration, inferring stopping from tonnage, treating 15 ppm as geographical permission, or omitting applicable ORB fields. Check area, equipment, certificates and records.See the linked page for conditions, consequences and preventive measures.View page →
Garbage Record BookAvoid confusing the plan with the record book, extending the international-voyage qualification to all ships, recording retained garbage as delivered, omitting incineration or losses, or invoking an exception without documenting its conditions and precautions.See the linked page for conditions, consequences and preventive measures.View page →
IncineratorAvoid banning PVC without considering appropriate approval, accepting sludge from other ships, replacing continuous monitoring with hourly readings, or confusing generated ashes with delivered ashes. There is no universal ratio between running hours and ash quantity.See the linked page for conditions, consequences and preventive measures.View page →
Ballast WaterAvoid unilateral D-1 after failure, preventive bypass based on a previous port difficulty, postponing plan/familiarization until future amendments, confusing BWMS approval with the IBWMC, or omitting final position A.2.See the linked page for conditions, consequences and preventive measures.View page →
Fuel ChangeoverAvoid calculating one pipe instead of the system, omitting compatibility/viscosity checks, completing after the boundary, missing tank volumes, treating FONAR as permission, or converting two geographical transitions into two necessarily mandatory fuel changes.See the linked page for conditions, consequences and preventive measures.View page →
MARPOL Annex VIAvoid omitting the ODS equipment list/Record Book and Regulation 12.6 entries; avoid prohibiting HSFO without checking equivalence, treating every old engine as Tier II, omitting 13.5.3 records, confusing EIAPP with the IAPP calendar, applying CII to every DCS ship, or merging SOx and NOx dates.See the linked page for conditions, consequences and preventive measures.View page →
Managing a Non-Conformity (NC)NC closed without verifying the effectiveness of the actionThe root cause remains and the NC recurs (repeat NC)View page →
Reporting a Near MissPunitive culture towards those who reportThe reporting rate collapses and useful information is lostView page →
Fire Drill and Fire SafetyDrill conducted as a simple announcement, without practical use of the equipmentThe crew does not gain real familiarity with emergency proceduresView page →
ECDIS (Electronic Chart Display and Information System)ENCs not updated or subscription expiredNavigation with outdated chart data, PSC deficiencyView page →
Crew Familiarisation and TrainingSignature without checking understandingNominal preparation onlyView page →
Musters and Abandon Ship DrillEmergency duties not understood before sailing or onboard training later than two weeksPSC deficiency, real risk in the event of an emergency before familiarization is completedView page →
Managing DeficienciesDeficiency rectified but not linked to the SMS's NC/CAPA systemThe root cause is not analysed and the deficiency recurs at subsequent inspectionsView page →
Communicating with the PSCORehearsed, uniform answers from the whole crew, perceived as not genuineThe PSCO extends the inspection to verify the substance behind the answersView page →
Enclosed Space EntryEntry without instrumental verification of the atmosphere, relying only on the visual appearance of the spaceAn oxygen-deficient or toxic atmosphere goes undetected, a mortal riskView page →
COLREG in PracticeWriting Every ship under way as the general scope, confusing heading and track under Rule 10, or describing MASS as still expected in May 2026.Incorrect operational decision or regulatory statusView page →
Bridge Resource Management (BRM)Tasks not explicitly assigned during critical phases, with overlaps or gaps in responsibilityNo one monitors a critical aspect, assuming someone else is handling itView page →
Planned Maintenance System (PMS) and Auxiliary MachineryAutomatically deriving an interval or minimum inventory from critical classification alone.Non-compliant decision or treatmentView page →
Tail Shaft SurveyPresenting Continuous Machinery Survey/CMS as an autonomous choice to avoid shaft withdrawal or using one five-year cycle.Non-compliant decision or treatmentView page →
Intermediate SurveyScheduling IOPP in month 30 as though the windows were continuous, or deferring every defect to the next survey without assessing severity and the assigned deadline.Check the individual ship’s requirements and documents before closing the work.View page →
EEXI and Engine Power Limitation (EPL)Using the power reserve to recover commercial delays.Use outside the safety purposes provided for override.View page →
Sewage ManagementAvoid “at least 12” instead of “more than 12”, measuring from a generic coast rather than MARPOL nearest land, treating the approved rate as optional, or using an STP as permission in every jurisdiction.See the linked page for conditions, consequences and preventive measures.View page →
Bunker Delivery NoteAvoid sampling LNG as conventional fuel, copying the BDN onto the label, making representatives optional, discarding at month twelve without checking consumption, or opening the statutory sample for an ordinary commercial claim.See the linked page for conditions, consequences and preventive measures.View page →
Handling Seafarer Complaints (MLC 2006)Complaint procedure not provided or not clearly explained to the seafarer on joiningSeafarer unaware of their rights and the complaint procedure, MLC deficiency at inspectionView page →
Permit to Work SystemHot work permit renewed without a new atmosphere test if the work extends beyond the initial validityRisk conditions not updated, possible accident with an atmosphere that has changed in the meantimeView page →
Ship Security Plan and the ISPS CodeSSO lacks a VI/5 CoP valid under Administration and flag rulesClear ground for a more detailed security examinationView page →
Life-Saving Appliances: Liferafts, EPIRB and SARTApplicable liferaft servicing interval exceededSerious deficiency, possible detentionView page →
USCG Port State ControlConfusing an eligible flag with a QUALSHIP 21-enrolled vesselIncentives or boarding expectations are applied when unavailableView page →
Tokyo MOU: Regional SpecificitiesApplying Paris MoU profiles and priorities in Tokyo MoUPreparation is not calibrated to the competent regimeView page →
Ro-Ro Cargo SecuringCrew calculates an out-of-CSM configuration ad hocArrangement lacks the required approved basisView page →
Reefer Container MonitoringConfusing set point, air temperature and product temperature: record which quantity is measured.See the linked page for conditions, consequences and preventive measures.View page →
Managing Cargo ClaimsUnqualified bill despite apparent defectsIt may be prima facie evidence of receipt as described and materially restrict contrary evidence, especially against a lawful third-party holderView page →
Passage Planning in Polar Waters (Polar Code)Applying one date to every added shipRequirement applied early or deadline missedView page →
Electronic Navigation and GNSS ResiliencePromising accurate position with L1/L2/L5 during complete interference or making multi-band/RAIM universally mandatory.Incorrect operational decision or regulatory statusView page →
VTS Traffic ManagementTreating every VTS message as a binding order or, conversely, reducing every instruction to a mere recommendation.Incorrect operational decision or regulatory statusView page →
Boiler OperationsAlways ordering a safety-valve test under actual working conditions or confusing crew inspection with statutory internal inspection.Non-compliant decision or treatmentView page →
Refrigeration PlantExtending the full F-gas regime to every ship or saying high-GWP was simply banned in 2020 without thresholds, transition and reclaimed/recycled exceptions through 2030.Non-compliant decision or treatmentView page →
Operational Energy Efficiency in the Engine RoomMain engine run chronically at very low loads for commercial reasons, without monitoring the impact on specific efficiencySpecific consumption worse than expected, with a negative impact on the CII ratingView page →
Anchor and Chain Cable SurveyDeclaring full five-year gauging and measuring every link at every Renewal/Special Survey.Non-compliant decision or treatmentView page →
Cargo Hold Survey for Bulk Carriers (ESP)Attributing drone/coating/survey extent to UR Z11, saying formally recognized since 2025, or using generic age thresholds as ESP entry trigger.Non-compliant decision or treatmentView page →
Shipyard Waste Management during Dry DockClassification by nameWrong code and destinationView page →
Safety Construction, Equipment and Radio CertificateAlways expecting three separate documents or using the Radio date as proof that other scopes were also examined.Check the individual ship’s requirements and documents before closing the work.View page →
ISPS Certification (International Ship Security Certificate)Confusing expiry with the intermediate window, or treating detention as automatic for every ISSC problem.Check the individual ship’s requirements and documents before closing the work.View page →
MLC Certification (Maritime Labour Certificate and DMLC)Updating the DMLC without handling certification; calculating anniversaries from issue; postponing existing duties until 2027.Check the individual ship’s requirements and documents before closing the work.View page →
Ballast Water Management Convention In DepthUsing type approval as the only evidence of onboard commissioning.Evidence of correct installation and testing on the ship is missing.View page →
Biofouling ManagementRequiring a certified in-water cleaning service or claiming formal IMO compliance without an identified scheme.Non-compliant decision or treatmentView page →
Underwater Radiated Noise (URN)Writing EBP until 2026, possible extension, or turning the extension into a mandatory obligation.Non-compliant decision or treatmentView page →
Anti-Fouling SystemsAvoid equating “no dry-docking since 2023” with an exception for an ordinary ship, confusing documentary thresholds with freedom of use, renewing a system with only an internal entry, or treating flag notification as an automatic extension.See the linked page for conditions, consequences and preventive measures.View page →
VOC Management PlanAvoid a generic plan without COW or a responsible person, language unsuitable for the voyage, confusing VECS with the whole plan, treating three-year acceptance as a right, or turning the P/V proposal into an instruction to modify equipment.See the linked page for conditions, consequences and preventive measures.View page →
Management of Change (MoC)Internal approval without checking statutory limitsInadmissible activity despite a MoCView page →
Dangerous Goods Manifest and Notification to Port AuthoritiesManifest compiled on the basis of initial declarations without being updated after changes to the stowage planIncorrect information on the actual position of the dangerous goods in an emergencyView page →
Lithium Batteries: Thermal Runaway and Fire Response on BoardUniversal agent/strategyResponse conflicts with stowage or shipView page →
IMDG Training and Crew EducationShore-based Chapter 1.3 training and shipboard competence requirements not distinguishedThe wrong legal basis and training path are assigned to personnelView page →
Watertight Doors and Compartment IntegrityDoor category and applicable rule not identified before setting its position at seaA passenger-ship or category-specific provision is generalised to the wrong ship or doorView page →
Helicopter Operations and Helideck SafetyHelicopter operation conducted without dedicated firefighting personnel present during refuellingCritical response time lost in the event of ignition during refuellingView page →
Black Sea MOU: Regional SpecificitiesUsing the 2025 rate as proof of stricter inspectionA descriptive figure is converted into a causeView page →
Indian Ocean MOU: Regional SpecificitiesTransferring another MoU’s profiles or priorities to IOMOUPreparation is not calibrated to the competent AuthorityView page →
Heavy Lift Cargo and Project CargoImprovised onboard Annex 13 calculationStructural assessment and acceptance process are missingView page →
BNWAS and Anti-Collision Alert SystemsPresenting under way and autopilot as alternative triggers or inventing a uniform IMO periodicity for end-to-end/power-failure tests.Incorrect operational decision or regulatory statusView page →
Predictive Maintenance based on IoT SensorsCiting 70% of new ships, 2024/2034 market values, or presenting predictive maintenance as automatic replacement.Non-compliant decision or treatmentView page →
Boiler Water TreatmentImposing six daily tests, declaring polyelectrolyte superior, using 1,000 µS/cm, 15 minutes/watch or universal numerical dosing.Non-compliant decision or treatmentView page →
Managing Shipyard Repair ContractsTimeline presented as a standardFalse assuranceView page →
Managing Surveys under Dual/Multiple ClassificationConfusing double and dual class; using only one status; assuming all work is automatically accepted.Check the individual ship’s requirements and documents before closing the work.View page →
Statement of Compliance for Ships in Temporary Lay-upDocument treated as universalLegal effect overstatedView page →
Digitalization of Statutory CertificatesCiting only FAL.5/Circ.39/Rev.2 as current or calling MLC an IMO Convention.Non-compliant decision or treatmentView page →
Onboard Carbon Capture and Storage (OCCS)Calling OCCS a lower-intensity energy source or promising settled future accounting.Non-compliant decision or treatmentView page →
Shore Power and Cold Ironing (Onshore Power Supply)Conflating AFIR and FuelEUSeparate infrastructure duties, ship duties and availability at the individual quay.View page →
Wind-Assisted Propulsion Systems (WAPS)Saving transferred from another shipUnreliable business caseView page →
Dangerous Solid Bulk Cargoes: the IMSBC Code, Liquefaction and Self-HeatingDoubt about the shipper's moisture-content certificate treated as resolved by a shipboard indicationCargo with moisture above the TML loaded without the risk being detectedView page →
MARPOL Annex III: Harmful Substances Carried in Packaged Form'MARINE POLLUTANT' marking not applied because it is considered redundant relative to the primary IMDG class labellingNon-compliance with MARPOL Annex III even when the IMDG safety classification is correctView page →
Polar Waters DischargesAvoid measuring from ice instead of also from land, equating STP certification with discharge approval, carrying an HFO waiver into another Party’s waters, or treating low-sulphur fuel as automatically outside the HFO definition.See the linked page for conditions, consequences and preventive measures.View page →
Contractor and External Supplier ManagementSupplier controls inadequate for the service or SMSCompetence, approvals or safety not demonstrated; possible NCView page →
Whistleblowing and Anonymous Reporting of Non-ConformitiesAnonymity and confidentiality treated as synonyms or universal MLC dutiesIncorrect expectations and legal basisView page →
Immersion Suits and Thermal ProtectionImmersion suits counted from the number of lifeboats on a cargo ship, where the criterion is per personFewer suits than persons embarked, with the shortfall never showing up in any countView page →
Fixed Firefighting Systems: CO2 and Water MistCO2 system dosing not re-verified after structural modifications to the protected spaceInsufficient CO2 concentration for effective extinguishing in the modified spaceView page →
Means of Escape and Emergency Escape RoutesMeans of escape from Category A machinery spaces verified only for their formal existence, without verifying the actual independence of the two routesBoth means of escape potentially compromised by the same event (e.g. a fire blocking a single common route)View page →
Managing an Appeal against a DetentionAppeal addressed to the individual PSCO who carried out the detention instead of the competent maritime authority of the port StateAppeal not processed according to the correct formal procedureView page →
Coordination between Flag State and PSCSaying A.1206(34) introduced the DAOThe function’s origin and powers are assigned to the wrong sourceView page →
Break Bulk Cargo: Stowage, Dunnage and Damage PreventionStowage planning without reliable and verified weight, dimensions and centre-of-gravity data for the items concernedCargo instability and risk of damage during transportView page →
Charter Parties and Cargo-Specific ClausesVoyage and time charter confusedWrong economic mechanismView page →
Icebreaker-Assisted Convoy NavigationSaying convoy command replaces the Master's independent safety judgement or using seasonal statistics as an operational requirement.Incorrect operational decision or regulatory statusView page →
Datum Shift and Chart Reference in ECDISDescribing every datum uncertainty as GPS/ECDIS error, checking datum notes alone, or applying an unauthorised manual offset.Incorrect operational decision or regulatory statusView page →
Integrated Automation Systems and Unmanned Machinery Space (UMS)Imposing a daily full alarm/shutdown test or hard-coding a call to the Chief Engineer for every arrangement.Non-compliant decision or treatmentView page →
Digital Twin for the Engine RoomInvestment without checking the data needed for the use caseSimulation model fed by insufficient or low-quality data, with unreliable predictionsView page →
Managing Post-Repair Warranties (Warranty Claims)Assumed durationWrong deadlineView page →
Dry Dock Scheduling for Sister Ships (Sister Ship Scheduling)Specification copiedScope over or understatedView page →
Interim CertificatesTreating interim certificate as one SOLAS/MARPOL/MLC mechanism or claiming the same compliance/value as definitive.Non-compliant decision or treatmentView page →
Coordination between Class Surveys and Statutory Surveys (RO)HSSC used for classWrong windowView page →
Methanol and Ammonia Bunkering: Infrastructure and Real CasesCiting 48/200 ports, most ports or first ships 2026–2027 without primary source and method.Non-compliant decision or treatmentView page →
Just Transition and the Social Impact of DecarbonizationIdentical training for everyoneGaps in critical rolesView page →
Review of the EU MRV Framework in Light of the EU ETSWrong COM numberSource concerns a different ETS measureView page →
IMO DCS Transport WorkIncomplete period: recover, reconcile and submit gaps to the verifier, not delete the year.See the linked page for conditions, consequences and preventive measures.View page →
Prevention of Violence and Harassment OnboardPSSR course delivered from 2026 without the new competenceTraining does not meet the amended tableView page →
Master's Authority and Safety CultureMaster's overriding authority documented in the SMS but not concretely supported when the safety decision carries a commercial costErosion of the Master's trust in the system and implicit pressure to favour commercial needsView page →
Ro-Ro and Vehicle Spaces: New Fire Detection and Protection Requirements (2026)Keel-laying date not verified to determine applicability of the new 2026 requirementsDetection system design not compliant with the requirements applicable to the shipView page →
Shipboard Lifting Appliances: The New SOLAS Regulation II-1/3-13 RegimeCargo cranes left out of the survey, on the view that Regulation II-1/3-13 covers only non-commercial appliancesIn-scope appliances are omitted from controls, documentation and planning.View page →
Mediterranean MOU: Regional SpecificitiesCalling the 20% rise in the 2024 detention count a rate increaseCount and rate are confusedView page →
Bulk Carriers: PSC Risk Profile and Recurring DeficienciesAssigning the aggregated DNV ranking to bulk carriers aloneOperational priorities rely on a non-existent disaggregationView page →
BLU Code: Safety in the Loading and Unloading of Bulk CarriersUsing the information exchange instead of the agreed plan and checklist.See the linked page for conditions, consequences and preventive measures.View page →
Mandatory Reporting of Containers Lost at Sea (SOLAS 2026)Observation automatically sent to flag State as SOLAS dutyRecipients for the two events are confusedView page →
Cargo Record Book (Record Book for Noxious Liquid Substances)Prewash not compliant with the P&A ManualAnnex II breachView page →
Cargo Securing Manual and Cargo LashingCargo Securing Manual not updated after changes to the securing equipmentThe manual no longer reflects the ship's actual securing capacityView page →
Draft Survey and Determining Cargo QuantityConfusing the ship’s constant with variable ballast and consumables: measure the latter at initial and final surveys and check lightship and constant separately.See the linked page for conditions, consequences and preventive measures.View page →
IMDG Code — Carriage of Dangerous Goods in Packaged FormUsing 41-22 as a current alternative in 2026: verify the version applicable to the shipment.See the linked page for conditions, consequences and preventive measures.View page →
Loading/Discharging PlanShip/shore plan applied outside its scopeWrong operating regimeView page →
Tank CleaningUsing the P&A Manual as the sole safety guide or guarantee of next-cargo purity.See the linked page for conditions, consequences and preventive measures.View page →
Simulator Training: the Ongoing STCW ReviewPresenting 37 States, three months and specific Regulations as a Committee outcome without the exact primary document and paragraph.Incorrect operational decision or regulatory statusView page →
MASS Code: the New IMO Framework for Autonomous ShipsSaying entered into force, inventing a two-year voluntary introduction period, treating EBP as begun, or turning 2030/2032 into legal certainty.Incorrect operational decision or regulatory statusView page →
Methanol Engines: Reliability and Spare Parts Management in a Still-Young TechnologyClaiming 149 to 61 because of engine reliability problems or generalising supply-chain immaturity to every maker.Non-compliant decision or treatmentView page →
Fire Safety of Onboard Battery Rooms (BESS)Imposing massive and prolonged cooling, improvising isolation/water, entering before risk clearance, or treating EMSA/drills as universally mandatory.Non-compliant decision or treatmentView page →
Hong Kong Convention: Inventory of Hazardous Materials and Green PassportConfusing a Green Passport with a verified IHM, leaving the inventory unchanged since first issue, or applying the HKC 2030 deadline to EU documents already due.Check the individual ship’s requirements and documents before closing the work.View page →
Next-Generation Coating: Planning the Dry Dock ChoiceSelecting on price or advertised life alone, ignoring niche areas, or confusing a product data sheet with the ship’s AFS certificate.Check the individual ship’s requirements and documents before closing the work.View page →
Hot Work Permit at the Shipyard: Ship-Dock CoordinationUsing entry readings as hot-work authorisation, ignoring adjacent spaces or continuing after conditions change.Check the individual ship’s requirements and documents before closing the work.View page →
Change of Flag and the Shadow Fleet: What Changes for Surveys and CertificatesSaying issue before previous certificates expire as a general continuity guarantee.Non-compliant decision or treatmentView page →
Coordination between the HSSC Cycle and SIRE 2.0 Vetting InspectionsSaying every crew member must answer the entire SIRE 2.0 Question Library.Non-compliant decision or treatmentView page →
CII: 2027-2030 Reduction Factors and New SEEMP GranularityApplying Z to the previous year’s resultRequired CII is calculated from the wrong baseView page →
Alternative Fuels and Operational ReadinessApplying IGF Code compliance indiscriminately to ammonia, hydrogen, methanol and LPG.Non-compliant decision or treatmentView page →
CII (Carbon Intensity Indicator)Treating a single D as three consecutive D ratingsThe corrective-action obligation is misstatedView page →
EU ETS and FuelEU MaritimeWriting all MRV ships enter ETS in 2027, one ≥5,000 scope, or 100% of every global emission.Non-compliant decision or treatmentView page →
SEEMP Part II and Part IIIConflating Parts II and IIIDCS methodology and CII planning are not checked against their respective scopesView page →
Environmental Vetting and GHG RatingClaiming automatic exclusion by BHP/Vale/Cargill/Rio Tinto or merging GHG, Safety Score and age trigger.Non-compliant decision or treatmentView page →
Carriage of Radioactive Materials: IMDG Class 7 and the INF CodePort-call and transit regimes treated as identicalRoute requirements omitted or approvals sought without checking their basisView page →
Dangerous Goods in Holds on Non-Containerised General Cargo ShipsMode-specific stowage and segregation provisions not applied to conventional non-containerised cargoPhysically insufficient segregation distance in the holdView page →
CTU Code: Packing and Stowage of Cargo Transport UnitsCTU filled without a prior check of the structural integrity of the unitRisk of loss of tightness or structural failure during transportView page →
EmS Guide and MFAG: Responding to Emergencies Involving Dangerous GoodsEmS Guide or MFAG on board in an edition not consistent with the IMDG edition applied to the cargoAbsence of emergency procedures for the new entries introduced by the latest amendmentView page →
IBC Code and Operations on Chemical TankersP&A always attributed to classApproval authority misstatedView page →
Liquefied Gases and Operational Notes on the IGC CodeTank cooldown carried out too quickly relative to the prescribed cooling curveRisk of thermal shock and structural damage to the containment systemView page →
Safe Return to Port: The Design Principle for Passenger ShipsTreating SRtP system redundancy as purely a design feature, without verifying its operational upkeep over timeProgressive degradation of the actual return-to-port capability compared with what was foreseen at the design stageView page →
Passenger Musters at Embarkation: Before Departure, No Longer Within 24 HoursStill applying, out of habit or outdated training, the old rule of a muster 'within 24 hours of departure'Non-compliance with SOLAS III/19 as amended from 2015, with passengers lacking safety instructions for a stretch of the voyageView page →
Damage Stability of Ro-Ro Passenger Ships (SOLAS 2020)Determining the regime from keel date alone or from a sister ship’s dateA vessel caught by the delivery trigger or another SOLAS 2020 trigger may be classified incorrectlyView page →
Managing a Gastrointestinal Outbreak on BoardWaiting for a percentage threshold before applying the plan’s measures to an individual AGE caseDelayed identification, management and containmentView page →
SAR Cooperation Plan on Passenger ShipsSAR cooperation plan developed only once and never updated afterwardPlan no longer consistent with the actual operating area or the SAR services actually availableView page →
Persons with Reduced Mobility: Accessibility on BoardExtending the EAA indiscriminately to every digital system and onboard self-service terminalThe compliance perimeter exceeds the Directive’s scopeView page →
Evacuation Analysis on Passenger Ships: Simplified and Advanced MethodUsing the simplified method for complex ship configurations in which its underlying assumptions no longer holdEvacuation analysis not representative of actual behaviour in an emergencyView page →
Passenger Ship Safety Certificate: The Twelve-Month Renewal Survey RegimePSSC renewal survey planned last-minute, without integration into the ship's general operating calendarOperational pressure and risk of impact on scheduled passenger serviceView page →
Gangway OperationsMaterial errors include treating 600 mm as a universal operational clearance; linking a net only to water; assigning PPE an independent universal date; imposing a security configuration absent from the SSP; or treating ladder and winch as one lifting appliance.See the linked page for conditions, consequences and preventive measures.View page →
Tender Operations: Service Boats for Passenger TransferPresenting the MSC.1/Circ.1417 risk assessment and log as universal obligationsRecommendatory guidance is converted into a Convention requirement beyond its scopeView page →
Passenger Accounting: The Accuracy of the Roll-Call after Costa ConcordiaCounting of those present at assembly stations left to individual initiative, without a written and assigned procedureAs in the Costa Concordia case, inability to establish with certainty who is actually present or missingView page →
Crowd Management: Managing the Flow to Assembly StationsEmergency exercises conducted only with linear routes and cooperative passengers, without panic or misunderstanding scenariosCrew unprepared for actual passenger behaviour in a real emergencyView page →
Cabin Safety: Stateroom Security Requirements under the CVSSAIneffective visual identification or alternative means lacking documented reviewPossible USCG finding: assess the functional requirement and installed solutionView page →
The Onboard Medical Centre: Between MLC and Voluntary StandardsPresenting ACEP as a general legal requirementConfusion between binding requirements and a voluntary standardView page →
Turnaround OperationsRecurring errors are leaving interfaces unassigned or imposing names and controls absent from the SMS. Identify the responsible person, stop-work authority and the risk criterion actually applicable.See the linked page for conditions, consequences and preventive measures.View page →
North-East Atlantic ECASOx correctly deferred, NOx overlooked: the twelve-month suspension does not cover Tier III.See the linked page for conditions, consequences and preventive measures.View page →
Integrated Bilge Water Treatment SystemErrors: treating a draft as current law; installing or modifying routes without approval; equating working equipment with permitted discharge; denying or making the voluntary Statement of Fact mandatory.See the linked page for conditions, consequences and preventive measures.View page →
Marine Plastic Strategy and Pellet CodeAvoid waiting until 2030 for the plastics prohibition, using the GRB as the only loss notification, always requiring below-deck stowage without the safe guidance alternative, or presenting the future code as in force or bringing the EU maritime branch forward to 2027.See the linked page for conditions, consequences and preventive measures.View page →
NOx Technical Code: Certification of Ammonia and Multi-Fuel Engines (MEPC 84)Engine Family is not Engine Group: section 7.2 does not admit the former.See the linked page for conditions, consequences and preventive measures.View page →
New 2026 ECAs: Canadian Arctic and Norwegian SeaDo not confuse the NOx date in 2026 with SOx/PM in 2027 or with the North-East Atlantic calendar.See the linked page for conditions, consequences and preventive measures.View page →
SOPEP — Shipboard Oil Pollution Emergency PlanEmergency contacts not updatedDelayed notification in a real spillView page →
Crew Fatigue: The IMO 2026-2027 Review ProcessFormally tidy but inaccurate recordsFatigue and breaches remain hiddenView page →
Corrective and Preventive Action (CAPA)Corrective action addressing the symptom, not the root causeThe NC recurs in similar formView page →
Cyber Risk Management in the SMS (MSC.428(98))Cyber risk managed as a separate IT matter, not integrated into the SMS's general risk assessmentLack of integrated documentary evidence in the event of an audit, despite the existence of technical IT measuresView page →
Designated Person Ashore (DPA)DPA without real access to senior managementIneffective escalation and possible NCView page →
Document of Compliance (DOC) and Safety Management Certificate (SMC)Confusing DOC annual and SMC intermediate checksMissed verifications and validity not assured; possible enforcementView page →
Emergency Preparedness and Contingency PlanDrill reduced to an announcement without required elementsPreparedness not demonstratedView page →
Crew Familiarisation and TrainingSignature without checking understandingNominal preparation onlyView page →
Internal SMS AuditIndependence not assessed and no justification of a §12.5 exceptionObjectivity not demonstratedView page →
Management ReviewReview without evidence of evaluationSMS effectiveness not demonstratedView page →
Autonomous Ships (MASS): the Company's Responsibility under the SMSMASS responsibility allocated generically to the DPAMonitoring and operational control become confusedView page →
Pilot Transfer Arrangements: The New SOLAS V/23 Performance StandardNew construction for delivery from 2028 planned without specifying compliance with the new performance standard to the shipyardDevices compliant only with the old version of Regulation V/23, to be upgraded later at additional costView page →
Ship Fuel Safety: Flashpoint DeclarationBunkering started without having received the supplier's signed declaration on the flashpointNon-compliance with the new SOLAS requirement and risk of fuel with an unverified flashpoint on boardView page →
Emergency Generator TestTest limited to the start alone, without verifying the actual load pick-upHidden faults only emerge during a real emergency or a thorough inspectionView page →
GMDSS (Global Maritime Distress and Safety System)Radio tests performed at a supposedly universal interval or by a universal methodTest inconsistent with applicable instructions or inappropriate on-air callView page →
Lifeboat Inspection (Inspection and Maintenance of Life-Saving Boats)Crew on board during under-load release tests not specifically established as safeRisk of serious or fatal injury in the event of a hook malfunctionView page →
Passage PlanningPassage plan drawn up only for the open-sea route, not berth-to-berthCritical port manoeuvring phases not adequately plannedView page →
Fraudulent Certificates and Registrations: Paris MoU Guidance under DevelopmentTreating the announced guidance as already publishedUnverifiable indicators and procedures are attributed to itView page →
Pre-PSC ChecklistChecklist applied only when an inspection is considered 'likely'Pre-existing deficiencies remain undetected at port calls perceived as low riskView page →
Concentrated Inspection Campaigns (CIC)No specific preparation ahead of an announced CICA more thorough inspection on the topic catches the crew unpreparedView page →
Detention and BanningTreating every detention as automatically causing more frequent or detailed inspectionThe profile is predicted without applying its calculationView page →
Documentation Required on BoardOn-board certificate copy not updated after renewal or auditInconsistent documentation during inspectionView page →
Ship Risk Profile and New Inspection Regime (NIR)Using a Paris MoU profile or window for a Tokyo MoU callPriority and expected date may be wrongView page →
VDES and NAVDAT: the Next Generation of Digital Maritime CommunicationsEquipping for every RMSS or accepting an MSI gap based on dissemination rulesIncorrect configuration or compliance assessmentView page →
Next-Generation ECDIS: the S-100 FrameworkSaying no mandatory date fixed, presenting S-57 as the sole future basis, or turning 2029 into mandatory retrofit of every existing ECDIS.Incorrect operational decision or regulatory statusView page →
Anchoring and Anchor WatchChain paid out according to a fixed generic rule, without considering forecast weather/sea conditionsInsufficient anchor holding if conditions deteriorateView page →
Pilotage and Under Keel Clearance in Restricted AreasAttributing a simplified UKC formula directly to SOLAS V/34 or treating the pilot as a transfer of ship responsibility.Incorrect operational decision or regulatory statusView page →
VDR (Voyage Data Recorder)Annual performance test not carried out or overduePSC deficiency, risk that the VDR will not function correctly when neededView page →
Navigation in Restricted VisibilityReducing Rule 19(d) to do not alter towards a contact forward of the beam, omitting the second branch, or treating darkness as a standalone restricted-visibility category.Incorrect operational decision or regulatory statusView page →
WatchkeepingTreating 12 hours as the only possible arrangement or, conversely, inferring the waiver automatically from a short distance.Incorrect operational decision or regulatory statusView page →
Ammonia Engines: Safety and Reliability of the First Units in ServiceConfusing the three interim instruments, imposing 1 July 2028, or citing first ships/commercial service without owner/yard/class source and status.Non-compliant decision or treatmentView page →
Bunkering Operations and Fuel Quality ControlAttributing the checklist to MARPOL, checking only ≥60°C on the BDN, or treating 43°C emergency generator as the sole branch below 60°C.Non-compliant decision or treatmentView page →
Cyber Risk Management of Automation SystemsWrong cyber version or scopeControls and evidence demanded from the wrong shipView page →
Blackout and Failure ManagementDefining 45 seconds as a universal monthly measurement/record or ignoring passenger/cargo/configuration differences.Non-compliant decision or treatmentView page →
Critical Spare Parts ManagementCritical spares list not updated after changes to the identified critical equipmentMissing spares for equipment recently classified as criticalView page →
Fire Pumps and Fixed Systems in the Engine RoomEmergency pump test conducted using the same power supply as the main engine roomThe test does not genuinely verify the emergency condition the pump is designed forView page →
Purifiers and Separators (Fuel Oil / Lube Oil Purifiers)Changing settings without fuel data and maker instructionsIneffective or unstable separationView page →
Remote Inspection Techniques (RIT): Drone and ROV InspectionsAccepting generic drone certification as approval for every activity, losing finding locations or confusing published revisions with revisions already applicable.Check the individual ship’s requirements and documents before closing the work.View page →
Bottom Survey and In-Water Survey (IWS)Applying I/10 to every SOLAS ship, using Z10 as the general IWS source, or calling every IWS Extended Dry-Docking.Non-compliant decision or treatmentView page →
Coating and PSPC (Performance Standard for Protective Coatings)Writing other spaces or double-side/bottom without scope, or making newbuilding PSPC mandatory for every repair.Non-compliant decision or treatmentView page →
Dry Dock Entry PlanningCargo regime used for passenger shipWrong due date or methodView page →
Thickness Measurement (Ultrasonic Thickness Measurement, UTM)Applying Z10.1–Z10.5 to every ship or transferring substantial-corrosion definitions outside ship/survey scope.Non-compliant decision or treatmentView page →
Survey in Dry DockUsing Special/Renewal as one survey or presenting UR Z17 Rev.22 as already operative in 2026.Non-compliant decision or treatmentView page →
Rudder and Sea Chests (Sea Chests and Sea Valves)Saying necessarily dry dock or always open every sea chest/valve while ignoring surveyor and approved IWS/EDD.Non-compliant decision or treatmentView page →
The IP Code: the Industrial Personnel Safety CertificateCounting only IP, saying authorisations cease to apply, or using one transition for cargo and HSC.Non-compliant decision or treatmentView page →
Annual SurveyReducing the survey to paperwork, ignoring modifications or confusing a future BWM amendment with an effective requirement.Check the individual ship’s requirements and documents before closing the work.View page →
Condition of Class and RecommendationsMarking a finding closed solely on the yard’s statement or treating an extension request as authorisation.Check the individual ship’s requirements and documents before closing the work.View page →
Harmonized System of Survey and Certification (HSSC)Treating printed expiry as the only relevant date or using an extension as an ordinary planning allowance.Check the individual ship’s requirements and documents before closing the work.View page →
International Load Line CertificateReducing all causes of invalidity to the need for increased freeboard.Check the individual ship’s requirements and documents before closing the work.View page →
Remote Survey Guidance: Remote Survey, ISM Audits and ISPS VerificationsConfusing eligibility of an individual item with eligibility of the entire survey; extending DOC exceptions to shipboard audits; treating remote ISPS verification as routine; routinely recording interviews.Incomplete or unacceptable verification; loss of confidentiality.View page →
Renewal Survey and Certificate RenewalConfusing booking, completion and certificate issue; adding one and three months as available tolerance.Check the individual ship’s requirements and documents before closing the work.View page →
Tonnage Certificate and IMO NumberConfusing GT with tonnes of weight, assuming unlimited validity after alterations or requesting a new ship IMO number for flag transfer.Check the individual ship’s requirements and documents before closing the work.View page →
IMO Net-Zero FrameworkWriting MEPC 84 approved detailed implementation guidelines or prices have been set.Non-compliant decision or treatmentView page →

Every operational page has a recurring-mistakes section: this page reproduces one entry and links to the full discussion.

Entries aligned with the recurring-mistakes sections of the linked pages on 16 September 2026. The Consequence / prevention column describes effects or preventive measures according to the source; this is not a statistical ranking.

Last substantive revision: 16 September 2026 · page fingerprint 963138db1869