Learning

Mistake Library Live

The archive of the most common mistakes, with the typical consequence and a link to the page explaining how to avoid them.

Topic	Mistake	Typical consequence
Oil Record Book	Entry not signed by the Master	PSC deficiency, possible detention	View page →
Sludge Management	Sludge balance with an unexplained discrepancy	Suspicion of illegal discharge	View page →
Bilge Water	Manual bypass of the OWS alarm system	Environmental offence, detention	View page →
Garbage Record Book	Garbage Management Plan not updated after the 100GT threshold change	Deficiency for ships 100-400GT	View page →
Incinerator	Incineration while in port	Local/Annex VI violation	View page →
Ballast Water	Using the old BWRB format after 1 February 2025	PSC deficiency	View page →
Fuel Changeover	Changeover started too late relative to the ECA boundary	Annex VI deficiency	View page →
MARPOL Annex VI	Voyage plan not updated with the new ECAs (Mediterranean, Arctic/Norway)	Non-compliant fuel used in an area now regulated	View page →
Non Conformity	NC closed without verifying the effectiveness of the corrective action	The root cause remains and the NC recurs	View page →
Near Miss	Punitive culture toward those who report a close call	Reporting rate collapses, useful information is lost	View page →
Fire Drill	Drill run as a simple announcement, without practical use of the equipment	Crew unprepared for a real emergency	View page →
ECDIS	Anti-grounding alarms disabled to reduce false alarms	Loss of ECDIS's main safety function	View page →
Musters	New crew member not familiarised within the required 2 weeks	PSC deficiency, real risk in an emergency	View page →
Deficiency Management	Deficiency rectified but not linked to the SMS NC/CAPA system	The root cause remains unresolved, risk of recurrence	View page →
Communicating with the PSCO	Prepared, uniform answers from the whole crew, perceived as insincere	The PSCO extends the inspection beyond what was expected	View page →
Enclosed Space Entry	Entry without an instrumental atmosphere test	Real risk of death, among the most severe on board	View page →
COLREG	Crossing a TSS at an angle not close to 90°	Risk of collision with lane traffic	View page →
Bridge Resource Management	No check that the team shares the same mental model of the situation	Decisions made on different information bases among team members	View page →
Planned Maintenance System	Standby equipment not tested because it is 'not in use'	A failure of the primary unit reveals that the standby unit doesn't work either	View page →
Tail Shaft Survey	Continuous monitoring (CMS) data collected but not systematically analysed	Deterioration trend not detected in time	View page →
HSSC	Intermediate Survey conducted outside the 3-month window allowed around the anniversary date	Certificate endorsement not valid, PSC deficiency	View page →
EEXI/EPL	Engine Power Limitation chosen without assessing its impact on maximum commercial speed	Reduced operational flexibility discovered only afterwards	View page →
Sewage Management	Distance from shore estimated instead of GPS-verified before an untreated discharge	Violation of MARPOL Annex IV Regulation 11	View page →
Bunker Delivery Note	MARPOL sample not taken with a traceable procedure at the time of bunkering	Unable to demonstrate fuel compliance in case of a dispute	View page →
MLC Complaint Handling	Complaint procedure not clearly explained to the seafarer on joining	MLC deficiency in a PSC inspection	View page →
Permit to Work	Hot work permit left open beyond the maximum 12-hour validity	Work in progress without valid formal authorisation	View page →
Ship Security Plan/ISPS	SSO certificate expired or not on board at the time of inspection	Automatic grounds for detention under the 2025 PSC procedures	View page →
Liferaft/EPIRB	12-month liferaft maintenance interval exceeded	Serious deficiency, possible detention	View page →
USCG Port State Control	Assumption that Paris/Tokyo MOU compliance is enough for US calls too	Unpleasant surprise when facing USCG-specific, non-harmonised requirements	View page →
Tokyo MOU	Ballast Water Management System (BWMS) not checked before a call in the Asia-Pacific region	Deficiency in the category most frequent in the 2025 CICs	View page →
Ro-Ro Cargo Securing	Standard number of lashing points applied without considering the vehicle's actual centre of gravity	Insufficient lashing for vehicles with a high centre of gravity	View page →
Reefer Container Monitoring	Temperature checks logged generically, without hourly detail	Unable to demonstrate the real extent of a deviation in a dispute	View page →
Cargo Claim Handling	No reservation noted on the bill of lading despite non-compliant conditions at loading	Presumption of carrier liability for pre-existing damage	View page →
Polar Waters Passage Planning	Voyage plan for polar waters reusing the standard passage planning approach	Failure to consider ice, SAR capability and places of refuge	View page →
GNSS Resilience	Exclusive reliance on GNSS position without cross-checking in areas of known risk	Use of a spoofed position without timely detection	View page →
VTS Traffic Management	VTS guidance perceived as binding orders rather than information/assistance	Suboptimal navigational decisions without the Master's full critical assessment	View page →
Boiler Operations	Safety device checks limited to a visual inspection, without testing under operating conditions	Safety valve malfunction not detected until a critical event	View page →
Refrigeration Plant	No advance planning for the transition to low-GWP refrigerants	Supply difficulties as regulatory deadlines approach	View page →
Engine Room Energy Efficiency	Engine performance deterioration attributed generically to 'wear' without checking hull/propeller fouling	Hull cleaning not scheduled in time, growing impact on consumption	View page →
Anchor Chain Cable Survey	Only the most visibly worn links renewed instead of the whole affected length	Non-compliance with the length-based renewal rule	View page →
Cargo Hold Survey Bulk Carrier	Coating condition assessed as 'POOR' but not logged or re-examined at the Annual Survey	Non-compliance with IACS UR Z11 rev.7	View page →
Shipyard Waste Management	Blasting residue containing organotin compounds treated as generic shipyard waste	Risk of environmental contamination of the shipyard site	View page →
Safety Construction/Equipment/Radio	Anniversary dates of the three certificates not synchronised under the HSSC cycle	Unnecessary back-to-back surveys and risk of a missed deadline	View page →
ISPS Certification	ISSC intermediate audit scheduled right up against the deadline of the window between the 2nd and 3rd anniversary	Risk of missing the required window	View page →
MLC Certification	DMLC Part II not updated following changes to onboard procedures	Discrepancy found during inspection between the declared document and actual practice	View page →
BWM Convention In Depth	BWMS commissioning test documentation not systematically kept on board	Unable to demonstrate actual operational compliance if checked	View page →
Biofouling Management	In-water cleaning performed by services without a containment and capture system for residues	Release of invasive organisms and antifouling paint residues into the environment	View page →
Underwater Radiated Noise	Propeller cavitation not monitored as a primary source of underwater noise	Failure to identify an easily correctable cause	View page →
Anti-Fouling Systems	Cybutryne removal postponed beyond the 60-month limit since last application	Non-compliance with the maximum deadline set by the 2021 amendments	View page →
VOC Management Plan	Crew not specifically trained on VOC procedures, confused with general cargo procedures	Incomplete application of emission-minimisation measures	View page →
Management of Change	Changes implemented informally without a structured assessment process	Risks associated with the change not identified before implementation	View page →
Dangerous Goods Manifest	Manifest not updated after changes to the actual stowage plan	Wrong information on the location of dangerous goods in an emergency	View page →
Lithium Batteries	Battery fire handled with conventional firefighting techniques	Ineffective extinguishing and risk of reignition	View page →
IMDG Training	Generic training for the whole crew without distinguishing the three required levels	Personnel with direct responsibilities not adequately prepared	View page →
Watertight Doors	Watertight doors kept open while underway for ease of passage	Watertight subdivision defeated in the event of a sudden breach	View page →
Helicopter Operations	Refuelling carried out without dedicated firefighting personnel present	Critical response time lost in the event of ignition during refuelling	View page →
Black Sea MOU	Preparation based only on Paris MOU statistics, without considering regional specifics	Underestimation of the real inspection/detention risk in the region	View page →
Indian Ocean MOU	Breadth and variety of member states underestimated in voyage planning	Calls at member states of the regime not recognised as such	View page →
Heavy Lift Cargo	Standard CSS lashing tables applied by analogy to a non-standardised cargo	Underestimation of the actual forces acting on the cargo and insufficient lashing	View page →
BNWAS	System handled as a mechanical formality, automatic reset without real vigilance verification	The system loses its function of genuinely verifying the officer's active presence	View page →
IoT Predictive Maintenance	Sensors installed but data collected without systematic trend analysis	Impending failure not anticipated despite the instrumentation being available	View page →
Boiler Water Treatment	Daily TDS/chloride/phosphate tests skipped for lack of time	Corrosion or scale formation not detected in time	View page →
Shipyard Repair Contracts	Generic repair specification developed without a detailed analysis of the ship's actual condition	Additional work negotiated under unfavourable contractual conditions during execution	View page →
Multi-Class Survey	Bilateral Agreement between the two Classification Societies not checked before planning the survey cycle	Duplicated surveys or coverage gaps between the two class societies	View page →
Statement of Compliance for Temporary Lay-up	Essential checks neglected during lay-up on the assumption the ship is 'non-operational' and therefore low risk	Undetected deterioration that lengthens the reactivation survey	View page →
Digital Statutory Certificates	Electronic certificate treated as a simple PDF scan, without the required technical safeguards	The document is not recognised as the legal equivalent of the paper certificate	View page →
Onboard Carbon Capture and Storage	Investment in an OCCS system based on the expectation of an immediate EEXI or CII credit	Regulatory expectations disappointed, since the credit is not yet recognised	View page →
Shore Power and Cold Ironing	Port call planning based only on the regulatory obligation, without checking actual OPS infrastructure availability	Unable to connect to OPS despite the obligation	View page →
Wind-Assisted Propulsion Systems	WAPS technology chosen without assessing the wind conditions of the actual operating routes	Actual fuel savings significantly below expectations	View page →
Solid Bulk Dangerous Cargoes (IMSBC)	Shipper's moisture content certificate accepted without independent verification in case of doubt	Cargo with moisture above the TML loaded without the risk being detected	View page →
MARPOL Annex III	'MARINE POLLUTANT' marking not applied because deemed redundant with the primary IMDG class labelling	Non-compliance with MARPOL Annex III even when the IMDG safety classification is correct	View page →
Polar Waters Discharges	Only the standard MARPOL rules applied during a polar waters transit, without considering Polar Code Part II-A	Discharge non-compliant with the stricter restrictions specifically applicable in polar waters	View page →
Contractor Management	Supplier/contractor engaged without a documented, verifiable qualification procedure	Major non-conformity in an audit when evidence of qualification is requested	View page →
Whistleblowing	Whistleblowing channel not kept distinct from ordinary reporting channels	The reporter does not perceive a safe alternative when ordinary channels are inadequate	View page →
Immersion Suits	Number of immersion suits on board not checked against the number of boats and the actual crew carried	Insufficient coverage in a real abandon-ship situation	View page →
Fixed CO2/Water Mist Firefighting Systems	CO2 recharge reserve kept at 50% instead of the required 100%	Unable to mount a second full intervention if the fire reignites	View page →
Escape Routes	Category A machinery space escape routes checked only for their formal existence, without verifying true independence	Both escape routes potentially compromised by the same event	View page →
Appeal Against a Detention	Correcting deficiencies postponed pending the outcome of the appeal	Unnecessarily prolonged ship detention, since the detention is not suspended during the appeal	View page →
Flag State-PSC Coordination	SSO certificate validity not systematically checked before a security inspection	Automatic detention under Appendix 20, regardless of the ship's other conditions	View page →
Break Bulk Cargo	Over-stowing applied without checking the discharge order of subsequent ports	Cargo restowing and damage during intermediate discharge	View page →
Charter Party and Cargo Clauses	Safe port/safe berth clause accepted without a specific check of the nominated port's conditions	Contractual liability for a port that turns out to be unsafe	View page →
Icebreaker Convoy Navigation	Safe distance from the icebreaker set independently instead of following convoy command instructions	Risk of collision with re-formed ice or other convoy vessels	View page →
ECDIS Datum Shift and Chart Reference	GPS position shown by the ECDIS trusted without checking the cell's datum notes	Positional error not detected in areas with an unknown or unreliable WGS84 conversion	View page →
Integrated Automation and UMS	UMS regime kept active despite a critical alarm flagged as unverifiable	Loss of the equivalent safety required by SOLAS II-1 Part E without anyone noticing until a real event	View page →
Engine Room Digital Twin	Investment in a digital twin platform without a sufficiently mature sensor infrastructure	Simulation model fed by insufficient data, with unreliable predictions	View page →
Post-Repair Warranties	Warranty claim notified after the contractual deadlines	Claim rejected regardless of the technical merit of the defect	View page →
Sister-Ship Dry Dock Planning	Each ship in the series treated as an isolated case, without reusing lessons learned from the previous cycle	Known recurring issues on the series rediscovered from scratch at every dry dock cycle	View page →
Interim Certificates	Planning for the definitive certificate's audit/survey started too late relative to the interim's expiry	Real risk of the interim certificate expiring before the definitive one is ready	View page →
Class-Statutory Survey Coordination	Class and statutory surveys planned separately despite falling within the same HSSC window	Doubled operational disruption and extra cost for two separate surveyor visits	View page →
Methanol/Ammonia Bunkering	Planning based on theoretical technical compatibility, without checking actual bunkering availability along the routes	Practically unable to refuel the ship according to the original voyage plan	View page →
Just Transition and Decarbonization	Crew training on alternative fuels planned only right before the new ship's delivery	Crew unprepared for the ship entering service, with real operational risk	View page →
EU MRV Review	Scope of the MRV Regulation checked only once and never updated over time	A ship that falls into a recently included category without the Company noticing	View page →
IMO DCS Transport Work	Data collection systems upgrade postponed, relying only on the mandatory 2026 deadline	Systems not ready in time, risk of non-compliance at the deadline	View page →
Prevention of Violence and Harassment	PSSR training renewed without checking that it includes the new competency required from 2026	Certification formally completed but not compliant with the new STCW requirements	View page →
Master's Authority	The Master's overriding authority documented in the SMS but not concretely upheld when it carries a commercial cost	Erosion of the Master's trust in the system	View page →
Ro-Ro and Vehicle Spaces	Keel-laying date not checked to determine the applicability of the new 2026 requirements	Detection system design not compliant with the applicable requirements	View page →
SOLAS II-1/3-13 Lifting Appliances	Non-commercial lifting appliances not identified as subject to the new regime	Non-compliance discovered only at the Renewal Survey	View page →
Mediterranean MOU	Paris MOU statistics and priorities applied uncritically to calls in the Med MoU region	Preparation not calibrated to the real regional specifics	View page →
Bulk Carrier PSC	PSC preparation focused only on the structural/ESP component, neglecting ISM and maintenance	Detention for the deficiency categories that remain the most frequent in the segment	View page →
BLU Code	Ship/shore information exchange form filled in as a formality without checking it is actually applied	Actual loading sequence different from the one agreed, with structural risk	View page →
Containers Lost at Sea	Container loss reported only internally within the Company, without the notifications required by SOLAS from 2026	Non-compliance with the new obligation, risk not flagged for other ships	View page →
STCW Simulator Training	Certification paths planned around a sea service/simulator substitution not yet in force	Certification path non-compliant with the STCW requirements currently applicable	View page →
MASS Code	MASS Code assumed to already be binding on all autonomous ships from 2026	Incorrect regulatory planning relative to the actual legal status	View page →
Methanol Engines	Spare parts for methanol engines managed with the same logistics as conventional or LNG engines	Delays in the availability of critical specific spares, with prolonged machinery downtime	View page →
BESS Battery Rooms	Battery room treated as a generic extension of the engine room in the emergency plan	Inadequate response strategy in the event of thermal runaway	View page →
Hong Kong Convention IHM	IHM Part I treated as a document to prepare only close to final recycling	Difficult and imprecise retroactive reconstruction of the hazardous materials history	View page →
Next-Generation Coatings	Coating choice based only on immediate application cost, without considering the total life-cycle	Higher total life-cycle cost, more frequent dry dockings than necessary	View page →
Shipyard Hot Work Permit	Ship and shipyard permit systems not formally aligned before hot work begins	Confusion over responsibility and level of control, risk of safety gaps	View page →
Flag Change	Flag change completed without ensuring continuity of statutory certificate validity	Documentary gap period in which the ship operates without fully valid certificates	View page →
HSSC-Vetting Coordination	HSSC calendar and vetting inspection calendar managed separately without being shared	Unintended concentration of surveys and vetting inspections in the same time window	View page →
CII Reduction Factors	Revised SEEMP Part II not ready in time for the 1 January 2026 deadline	Documentary non-compliance with the new CII requirements	View page →
Class 7 Radioactive Materials	Approval from coastal states along the route requested too late relative to departure	Significant operational delay, unable to depart on schedule	View page →
General Cargo Dangerous Goods	Segregation categories applied without considering the absence of a container's physical enclosure	Physically insufficient segregation distance in the hold	View page →
Safe Return to Port	SRtP system redundancy considered only at the design stage, without verifying it is maintained operationally over time	Degradation of the real return-to-port capability relative to the original design	View page →
Passenger Musters	Old muster rule of 'within 24 hours of departure' applied, superseded since 2015	Non-compliance with SOLAS III/19, passengers without instructions for a leg of the voyage	View page →
Ro-Ro Passenger Damage Stability	Operating limits of one sister ship applied assuming the same stability regime	Actual operating limits of the ship exceeded, reduced safety margin	View page →
Gastrointestinal Outbreak	Waiting until the 3% threshold is reached before stepping up cleaning and surveillance	Failure to prevent progression to a formal outbreak	View page →
SAR Cooperation Plan	SAR cooperation plan developed once and never updated again	Plan no longer consistent with the actual operating area or available SAR services	View page →
Persons with Reduced Mobility	Accessibility requirements considered limited to the physical dimension only, ignoring the EAA's digital scope	Ticketing/information systems non-compliant with requirements binding since 2025	View page →
Evacuation Analysis	Simplified method used for complex ship configurations where its assumptions no longer hold	Evacuation analysis not representative of real emergency behaviour	View page →
Passenger Ship Safety Certificate	Annual PSSC survey planned last-minute, without integration into the general operating calendar	Operational pressure and risk of impact on scheduled passenger service	View page →
Gangway Operations	Access ladder used without checking that the actual angle is within the indicated maximum/minimum limits	Structural stress not anticipated by the design, risk of failure	View page →
Tender Operations	Lifejackets left stowed during tendering without a documented risk assessment	Operating practice with no documentary basis, indefensible in the event of an incident	View page →
Passenger Accounting	Counting of those present at muster stations left to individual initiative, without a written procedure	As in the Costa Concordia case, unable to establish who is present or missing	View page →
Crowd Management	Drills conducted only with linear routes and cooperative passengers, without panic scenarios	Crew unprepared for real passenger behaviour in an emergency	View page →
Cabin Safety (CVSSA)	CVSSA cabin compliance checked only generically, without verifying the exact technical specifications	Technical non-compliance detectable in a targeted USCG inspection	View page →
Medical Centre	Medical centre's clinical operating standards not aligned with the industry's reference ACEP guidelines	Medical centre below the standard the industry effectively expects	View page →
Turnaround Operations	No Simultaneous Operations Leader designated to coordinate conflicting turnaround activities	Coordination responsibility diffused, impacts not managed promptly	View page →
North-East Atlantic ECA	Passage planning and chart updates postponed close to the entry-into-force date (1 September 2027)	Risk of sailing in the new ECA without properly planned changeover procedures	View page →
Integrated Bilge Water Treatment System	Engine room personnel trained only on the traditional separator+alarm architecture, without updating for the installed integrated system	Inadequate handling of anomalies or alarms specific to the integrated system	View page →
Marine Plastic Strategy and Pellet Code	Container transport of plastic pellets handled with the same generic practices as any other dry cargo	Risk of massive dispersal at sea if the container is lost	View page →
Crew Fatigue	Rest hour logging treated as a mere documentary formality, without reflecting real fatigue management on board	Formal compliance that fails to prevent chronic fatigue build-up in the crew	View page →
Pilot Transfer Arrangements	Newbuildings with delivery from 2028 planned without specifying compliance with the new performance standard to the yard	Equipment compliant only with the old version of Regulation V/23, requiring later upgrade at extra cost	View page →
Fuel Safety and Flashpoint	Bunkering started without having received the supplier's signed flashpoint declaration	Non-compliance with the new SOLAS requirement and risk of fuel with an unverified flashpoint on board	View page →
Fraudulent Certificates and Registrations	Post-flag-change documentation treated as an administrative formality, without a thorough consistency check across the new certificates	Documentary inconsistencies flagged by the PSCO, triggering extra scrutiny even without a real irregularity	View page →
VDES and NAVDAT	Satellite equipment verified as compatible only with the historically contracted RMSS service, without a multi-RMSS check	Risk of missing critical MSI information transmitted via a different RMSS service	View page →
Next-Generation ECDIS S-100	Investment in new ECDIS equipment planned without checking the supplier's S-100 compatibility roadmap	Risk of equipment needing early replacement ahead of its expected life cycle	View page →
Ammonia Engines	Crew training on alternative fuels treated generically, without distinguishing the specific protocols for ammonia's toxicity	Inadequate response in the event of release or exposure, given the different risk profile	View page →
Remote Inspection Techniques (RIT)	RIT survey planned using an operator not verified as formally approved by the ship's own Classification Society	Risk that the survey is not recognised as valid for class purposes	View page →
IP Code (Industrial Personnel)	Pre-existing authorisation before 1 July 2024 assumed valid indefinitely, without planning the transition to the IP Code	Authorisation lapses at the next survey without an Industrial Personnel Safety Certificate ready	View page →
IMO Net-Zero Framework	Fleet planning based on the original entry-into-force date without monitoring slippages in the adoption process (the October 2025 session closed without agreement)	Fuel/compliance credit investments calibrated to a regulatory timeline that is no longer current	View page →

Every operational page in the MARPOL Operations module includes its own "Recurring mistakes" table in a dedicated section; this page collects them all into a single searchable index.