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Mistake Library Live

The archive of the most common mistakes, with the typical consequence and a link to the page explaining how to avoid them.

TopicMistakeTypical consequence
Oil Record BookEntry not signed by the MasterPSC deficiency, possible detentionView page →
Sludge ManagementSludge balance with an unexplained discrepancySuspicion of illegal dischargeView page →
Bilge WaterManual bypass of the OWS alarm systemEnvironmental offence, detentionView page →
Garbage Record BookGarbage Management Plan not updated after the 100GT threshold changeDeficiency for ships 100-400GTView page →
IncineratorIncineration while in portLocal/Annex VI violationView page →
Ballast WaterUsing the old BWRB format after 1 February 2025PSC deficiencyView page →
Fuel ChangeoverChangeover started too late relative to the ECA boundaryAnnex VI deficiencyView page →
MARPOL Annex VIVoyage plan not updated with the new ECAs (Mediterranean, Arctic/Norway)Non-compliant fuel used in an area now regulatedView page →
Non ConformityNC closed without verifying the effectiveness of the corrective actionThe root cause remains and the NC recursView page →
Near MissPunitive culture toward those who report a close callReporting rate collapses, useful information is lostView page →
Fire DrillDrill run as a simple announcement, without practical use of the equipmentCrew unprepared for a real emergencyView page →
ECDISAnti-grounding alarms disabled to reduce false alarmsLoss of ECDIS's main safety functionView page →
MustersNew crew member not familiarised within the required 2 weeksPSC deficiency, real risk in an emergencyView page →
Deficiency ManagementDeficiency rectified but not linked to the SMS NC/CAPA systemThe root cause remains unresolved, risk of recurrenceView page →
Communicating with the PSCOPrepared, uniform answers from the whole crew, perceived as insincereThe PSCO extends the inspection beyond what was expectedView page →
Enclosed Space EntryEntry without an instrumental atmosphere testReal risk of death, among the most severe on boardView page →
COLREGCrossing a TSS at an angle not close to 90°Risk of collision with lane trafficView page →
Bridge Resource ManagementNo check that the team shares the same mental model of the situationDecisions made on different information bases among team membersView page →
Planned Maintenance SystemStandby equipment not tested because it is 'not in use'A failure of the primary unit reveals that the standby unit doesn't work eitherView page →
Tail Shaft SurveyContinuous monitoring (CMS) data collected but not systematically analysedDeterioration trend not detected in timeView page →
HSSCIntermediate Survey conducted outside the 3-month window allowed around the anniversary dateCertificate endorsement not valid, PSC deficiencyView page →
EEXI/EPLEngine Power Limitation chosen without assessing its impact on maximum commercial speedReduced operational flexibility discovered only afterwardsView page →
Sewage ManagementDistance from shore estimated instead of GPS-verified before an untreated dischargeViolation of MARPOL Annex IV Regulation 11View page →
Bunker Delivery NoteMARPOL sample not taken with a traceable procedure at the time of bunkeringUnable to demonstrate fuel compliance in case of a disputeView page →
MLC Complaint HandlingComplaint procedure not clearly explained to the seafarer on joiningMLC deficiency in a PSC inspectionView page →
Permit to WorkHot work permit left open beyond the maximum 12-hour validityWork in progress without valid formal authorisationView page →
Ship Security Plan/ISPSSSO certificate expired or not on board at the time of inspectionAutomatic grounds for detention under the 2025 PSC proceduresView page →
Liferaft/EPIRB12-month liferaft maintenance interval exceededSerious deficiency, possible detentionView page →
USCG Port State ControlAssumption that Paris/Tokyo MOU compliance is enough for US calls tooUnpleasant surprise when facing USCG-specific, non-harmonised requirementsView page →
Tokyo MOUBallast Water Management System (BWMS) not checked before a call in the Asia-Pacific regionDeficiency in the category most frequent in the 2025 CICsView page →
Ro-Ro Cargo SecuringStandard number of lashing points applied without considering the vehicle's actual centre of gravityInsufficient lashing for vehicles with a high centre of gravityView page →
Reefer Container MonitoringTemperature checks logged generically, without hourly detailUnable to demonstrate the real extent of a deviation in a disputeView page →
Cargo Claim HandlingNo reservation noted on the bill of lading despite non-compliant conditions at loadingPresumption of carrier liability for pre-existing damageView page →
Polar Waters Passage PlanningVoyage plan for polar waters reusing the standard passage planning approachFailure to consider ice, SAR capability and places of refugeView page →
GNSS ResilienceExclusive reliance on GNSS position without cross-checking in areas of known riskUse of a spoofed position without timely detectionView page →
VTS Traffic ManagementVTS guidance perceived as binding orders rather than information/assistanceSuboptimal navigational decisions without the Master's full critical assessmentView page →
Boiler OperationsSafety device checks limited to a visual inspection, without testing under operating conditionsSafety valve malfunction not detected until a critical eventView page →
Refrigeration PlantNo advance planning for the transition to low-GWP refrigerantsSupply difficulties as regulatory deadlines approachView page →
Engine Room Energy EfficiencyEngine performance deterioration attributed generically to 'wear' without checking hull/propeller foulingHull cleaning not scheduled in time, growing impact on consumptionView page →
Anchor Chain Cable SurveyOnly the most visibly worn links renewed instead of the whole affected lengthNon-compliance with the length-based renewal ruleView page →
Cargo Hold Survey Bulk CarrierCoating condition assessed as 'POOR' but not logged or re-examined at the Annual SurveyNon-compliance with IACS UR Z11 rev.7View page →
Shipyard Waste ManagementBlasting residue containing organotin compounds treated as generic shipyard wasteRisk of environmental contamination of the shipyard siteView page →
Safety Construction/Equipment/RadioAnniversary dates of the three certificates not synchronised under the HSSC cycleUnnecessary back-to-back surveys and risk of a missed deadlineView page →
ISPS CertificationISSC intermediate audit scheduled right up against the deadline of the window between the 2nd and 3rd anniversaryRisk of missing the required windowView page →
MLC CertificationDMLC Part II not updated following changes to onboard proceduresDiscrepancy found during inspection between the declared document and actual practiceView page →
BWM Convention In DepthBWMS commissioning test documentation not systematically kept on boardUnable to demonstrate actual operational compliance if checkedView page →
Biofouling ManagementIn-water cleaning performed by services without a containment and capture system for residuesRelease of invasive organisms and antifouling paint residues into the environmentView page →
Underwater Radiated NoisePropeller cavitation not monitored as a primary source of underwater noiseFailure to identify an easily correctable causeView page →
Anti-Fouling SystemsCybutryne removal postponed beyond the 60-month limit since last applicationNon-compliance with the maximum deadline set by the 2021 amendmentsView page →
VOC Management PlanCrew not specifically trained on VOC procedures, confused with general cargo proceduresIncomplete application of emission-minimisation measuresView page →
Management of ChangeChanges implemented informally without a structured assessment processRisks associated with the change not identified before implementationView page →
Dangerous Goods ManifestManifest not updated after changes to the actual stowage planWrong information on the location of dangerous goods in an emergencyView page →
Lithium BatteriesBattery fire handled with conventional firefighting techniquesIneffective extinguishing and risk of reignitionView page →
IMDG TrainingGeneric training for the whole crew without distinguishing the three required levelsPersonnel with direct responsibilities not adequately preparedView page →
Watertight DoorsWatertight doors kept open while underway for ease of passageWatertight subdivision defeated in the event of a sudden breachView page →
Helicopter OperationsRefuelling carried out without dedicated firefighting personnel presentCritical response time lost in the event of ignition during refuellingView page →
Black Sea MOUPreparation based only on Paris MOU statistics, without considering regional specificsUnderestimation of the real inspection/detention risk in the regionView page →
Indian Ocean MOUBreadth and variety of member states underestimated in voyage planningCalls at member states of the regime not recognised as suchView page →
Heavy Lift CargoStandard CSS lashing tables applied by analogy to a non-standardised cargoUnderestimation of the actual forces acting on the cargo and insufficient lashingView page →
BNWASSystem handled as a mechanical formality, automatic reset without real vigilance verificationThe system loses its function of genuinely verifying the officer's active presenceView page →
IoT Predictive MaintenanceSensors installed but data collected without systematic trend analysisImpending failure not anticipated despite the instrumentation being availableView page →
Boiler Water TreatmentDaily TDS/chloride/phosphate tests skipped for lack of timeCorrosion or scale formation not detected in timeView page →
Shipyard Repair ContractsGeneric repair specification developed without a detailed analysis of the ship's actual conditionAdditional work negotiated under unfavourable contractual conditions during executionView page →
Multi-Class SurveyBilateral Agreement between the two Classification Societies not checked before planning the survey cycleDuplicated surveys or coverage gaps between the two class societiesView page →
Statement of Compliance for Temporary Lay-upEssential checks neglected during lay-up on the assumption the ship is 'non-operational' and therefore low riskUndetected deterioration that lengthens the reactivation surveyView page →
Digital Statutory CertificatesElectronic certificate treated as a simple PDF scan, without the required technical safeguardsThe document is not recognised as the legal equivalent of the paper certificateView page →
Onboard Carbon Capture and StorageInvestment in an OCCS system based on the expectation of an immediate EEXI or CII creditRegulatory expectations disappointed, since the credit is not yet recognisedView page →
Shore Power and Cold IroningPort call planning based only on the regulatory obligation, without checking actual OPS infrastructure availabilityUnable to connect to OPS despite the obligationView page →
Wind-Assisted Propulsion SystemsWAPS technology chosen without assessing the wind conditions of the actual operating routesActual fuel savings significantly below expectationsView page →
Solid Bulk Dangerous Cargoes (IMSBC)Shipper's moisture content certificate accepted without independent verification in case of doubtCargo with moisture above the TML loaded without the risk being detectedView page →
MARPOL Annex III'MARINE POLLUTANT' marking not applied because deemed redundant with the primary IMDG class labellingNon-compliance with MARPOL Annex III even when the IMDG safety classification is correctView page →
Polar Waters DischargesOnly the standard MARPOL rules applied during a polar waters transit, without considering Polar Code Part II-ADischarge non-compliant with the stricter restrictions specifically applicable in polar watersView page →
Contractor ManagementSupplier/contractor engaged without a documented, verifiable qualification procedureMajor non-conformity in an audit when evidence of qualification is requestedView page →
WhistleblowingWhistleblowing channel not kept distinct from ordinary reporting channelsThe reporter does not perceive a safe alternative when ordinary channels are inadequateView page →
Immersion SuitsNumber of immersion suits on board not checked against the number of boats and the actual crew carriedInsufficient coverage in a real abandon-ship situationView page →
Fixed CO2/Water Mist Firefighting SystemsCO2 recharge reserve kept at 50% instead of the required 100%Unable to mount a second full intervention if the fire reignitesView page →
Escape RoutesCategory A machinery space escape routes checked only for their formal existence, without verifying true independenceBoth escape routes potentially compromised by the same eventView page →
Appeal Against a DetentionCorrecting deficiencies postponed pending the outcome of the appealUnnecessarily prolonged ship detention, since the detention is not suspended during the appealView page →
Flag State-PSC CoordinationSSO certificate validity not systematically checked before a security inspectionAutomatic detention under Appendix 20, regardless of the ship's other conditionsView page →
Break Bulk CargoOver-stowing applied without checking the discharge order of subsequent portsCargo restowing and damage during intermediate dischargeView page →
Charter Party and Cargo ClausesSafe port/safe berth clause accepted without a specific check of the nominated port's conditionsContractual liability for a port that turns out to be unsafeView page →
Icebreaker Convoy NavigationSafe distance from the icebreaker set independently instead of following convoy command instructionsRisk of collision with re-formed ice or other convoy vesselsView page →
ECDIS Datum Shift and Chart ReferenceGPS position shown by the ECDIS trusted without checking the cell's datum notesPositional error not detected in areas with an unknown or unreliable WGS84 conversionView page →
Integrated Automation and UMSUMS regime kept active despite a critical alarm flagged as unverifiableLoss of the equivalent safety required by SOLAS II-1 Part E without anyone noticing until a real eventView page →
Engine Room Digital TwinInvestment in a digital twin platform without a sufficiently mature sensor infrastructureSimulation model fed by insufficient data, with unreliable predictionsView page →
Post-Repair WarrantiesWarranty claim notified after the contractual deadlinesClaim rejected regardless of the technical merit of the defectView page →
Sister-Ship Dry Dock PlanningEach ship in the series treated as an isolated case, without reusing lessons learned from the previous cycleKnown recurring issues on the series rediscovered from scratch at every dry dock cycleView page →
Interim CertificatesPlanning for the definitive certificate's audit/survey started too late relative to the interim's expiryReal risk of the interim certificate expiring before the definitive one is readyView page →
Class-Statutory Survey CoordinationClass and statutory surveys planned separately despite falling within the same HSSC windowDoubled operational disruption and extra cost for two separate surveyor visitsView page →
Methanol/Ammonia BunkeringPlanning based on theoretical technical compatibility, without checking actual bunkering availability along the routesPractically unable to refuel the ship according to the original voyage planView page →
Just Transition and DecarbonizationCrew training on alternative fuels planned only right before the new ship's deliveryCrew unprepared for the ship entering service, with real operational riskView page →
EU MRV ReviewScope of the MRV Regulation checked only once and never updated over timeA ship that falls into a recently included category without the Company noticingView page →
IMO DCS Transport WorkData collection systems upgrade postponed, relying only on the mandatory 2026 deadlineSystems not ready in time, risk of non-compliance at the deadlineView page →
Prevention of Violence and HarassmentPSSR training renewed without checking that it includes the new competency required from 2026Certification formally completed but not compliant with the new STCW requirementsView page →
Master's AuthorityThe Master's overriding authority documented in the SMS but not concretely upheld when it carries a commercial costErosion of the Master's trust in the systemView page →
Ro-Ro and Vehicle SpacesKeel-laying date not checked to determine the applicability of the new 2026 requirementsDetection system design not compliant with the applicable requirementsView page →
SOLAS II-1/3-13 Lifting AppliancesNon-commercial lifting appliances not identified as subject to the new regimeNon-compliance discovered only at the Renewal SurveyView page →
Mediterranean MOUParis MOU statistics and priorities applied uncritically to calls in the Med MoU regionPreparation not calibrated to the real regional specificsView page →
Bulk Carrier PSCPSC preparation focused only on the structural/ESP component, neglecting ISM and maintenanceDetention for the deficiency categories that remain the most frequent in the segmentView page →
BLU CodeShip/shore information exchange form filled in as a formality without checking it is actually appliedActual loading sequence different from the one agreed, with structural riskView page →
Containers Lost at SeaContainer loss reported only internally within the Company, without the notifications required by SOLAS from 2026Non-compliance with the new obligation, risk not flagged for other shipsView page →
STCW Simulator TrainingCertification paths planned around a sea service/simulator substitution not yet in forceCertification path non-compliant with the STCW requirements currently applicableView page →
MASS CodeMASS Code assumed to already be binding on all autonomous ships from 2026Incorrect regulatory planning relative to the actual legal statusView page →
Methanol EnginesSpare parts for methanol engines managed with the same logistics as conventional or LNG enginesDelays in the availability of critical specific spares, with prolonged machinery downtimeView page →
BESS Battery RoomsBattery room treated as a generic extension of the engine room in the emergency planInadequate response strategy in the event of thermal runawayView page →
Hong Kong Convention IHMIHM Part I treated as a document to prepare only close to final recyclingDifficult and imprecise retroactive reconstruction of the hazardous materials historyView page →
Next-Generation CoatingsCoating choice based only on immediate application cost, without considering the total life-cycleHigher total life-cycle cost, more frequent dry dockings than necessaryView page →
Shipyard Hot Work PermitShip and shipyard permit systems not formally aligned before hot work beginsConfusion over responsibility and level of control, risk of safety gapsView page →
Flag ChangeFlag change completed without ensuring continuity of statutory certificate validityDocumentary gap period in which the ship operates without fully valid certificatesView page →
HSSC-Vetting CoordinationHSSC calendar and vetting inspection calendar managed separately without being sharedUnintended concentration of surveys and vetting inspections in the same time windowView page →
CII Reduction FactorsRevised SEEMP Part II not ready in time for the 1 January 2026 deadlineDocumentary non-compliance with the new CII requirementsView page →
Class 7 Radioactive MaterialsApproval from coastal states along the route requested too late relative to departureSignificant operational delay, unable to depart on scheduleView page →
General Cargo Dangerous GoodsSegregation categories applied without considering the absence of a container's physical enclosurePhysically insufficient segregation distance in the holdView page →
Safe Return to PortSRtP system redundancy considered only at the design stage, without verifying it is maintained operationally over timeDegradation of the real return-to-port capability relative to the original designView page →
Passenger MustersOld muster rule of 'within 24 hours of departure' applied, superseded since 2015Non-compliance with SOLAS III/19, passengers without instructions for a leg of the voyageView page →
Ro-Ro Passenger Damage StabilityOperating limits of one sister ship applied assuming the same stability regimeActual operating limits of the ship exceeded, reduced safety marginView page →
Gastrointestinal OutbreakWaiting until the 3% threshold is reached before stepping up cleaning and surveillanceFailure to prevent progression to a formal outbreakView page →
SAR Cooperation PlanSAR cooperation plan developed once and never updated againPlan no longer consistent with the actual operating area or available SAR servicesView page →
Persons with Reduced MobilityAccessibility requirements considered limited to the physical dimension only, ignoring the EAA's digital scopeTicketing/information systems non-compliant with requirements binding since 2025View page →
Evacuation AnalysisSimplified method used for complex ship configurations where its assumptions no longer holdEvacuation analysis not representative of real emergency behaviourView page →
Passenger Ship Safety CertificateAnnual PSSC survey planned last-minute, without integration into the general operating calendarOperational pressure and risk of impact on scheduled passenger serviceView page →
Gangway OperationsAccess ladder used without checking that the actual angle is within the indicated maximum/minimum limitsStructural stress not anticipated by the design, risk of failureView page →
Tender OperationsLifejackets left stowed during tendering without a documented risk assessmentOperating practice with no documentary basis, indefensible in the event of an incidentView page →
Passenger AccountingCounting of those present at muster stations left to individual initiative, without a written procedureAs in the Costa Concordia case, unable to establish who is present or missingView page →
Crowd ManagementDrills conducted only with linear routes and cooperative passengers, without panic scenariosCrew unprepared for real passenger behaviour in an emergencyView page →
Cabin Safety (CVSSA)CVSSA cabin compliance checked only generically, without verifying the exact technical specificationsTechnical non-compliance detectable in a targeted USCG inspectionView page →
Medical CentreMedical centre's clinical operating standards not aligned with the industry's reference ACEP guidelinesMedical centre below the standard the industry effectively expectsView page →
Turnaround OperationsNo Simultaneous Operations Leader designated to coordinate conflicting turnaround activitiesCoordination responsibility diffused, impacts not managed promptlyView page →
North-East Atlantic ECAPassage planning and chart updates postponed close to the entry-into-force date (1 September 2027)Risk of sailing in the new ECA without properly planned changeover proceduresView page →
Integrated Bilge Water Treatment SystemEngine room personnel trained only on the traditional separator+alarm architecture, without updating for the installed integrated systemInadequate handling of anomalies or alarms specific to the integrated systemView page →
Marine Plastic Strategy and Pellet CodeContainer transport of plastic pellets handled with the same generic practices as any other dry cargoRisk of massive dispersal at sea if the container is lostView page →
Crew FatigueRest hour logging treated as a mere documentary formality, without reflecting real fatigue management on boardFormal compliance that fails to prevent chronic fatigue build-up in the crewView page →
Pilot Transfer ArrangementsNewbuildings with delivery from 2028 planned without specifying compliance with the new performance standard to the yardEquipment compliant only with the old version of Regulation V/23, requiring later upgrade at extra costView page →
Fuel Safety and FlashpointBunkering started without having received the supplier's signed flashpoint declarationNon-compliance with the new SOLAS requirement and risk of fuel with an unverified flashpoint on boardView page →
Fraudulent Certificates and RegistrationsPost-flag-change documentation treated as an administrative formality, without a thorough consistency check across the new certificatesDocumentary inconsistencies flagged by the PSCO, triggering extra scrutiny even without a real irregularityView page →
VDES and NAVDATSatellite equipment verified as compatible only with the historically contracted RMSS service, without a multi-RMSS checkRisk of missing critical MSI information transmitted via a different RMSS serviceView page →
Next-Generation ECDIS S-100Investment in new ECDIS equipment planned without checking the supplier's S-100 compatibility roadmapRisk of equipment needing early replacement ahead of its expected life cycleView page →
Ammonia EnginesCrew training on alternative fuels treated generically, without distinguishing the specific protocols for ammonia's toxicityInadequate response in the event of release or exposure, given the different risk profileView page →
Remote Inspection Techniques (RIT)RIT survey planned using an operator not verified as formally approved by the ship's own Classification SocietyRisk that the survey is not recognised as valid for class purposesView page →
IP Code (Industrial Personnel)Pre-existing authorisation before 1 July 2024 assumed valid indefinitely, without planning the transition to the IP CodeAuthorisation lapses at the next survey without an Industrial Personnel Safety Certificate readyView page →
IMO Net-Zero FrameworkFleet planning based on the original entry-into-force date without monitoring slippages in the adoption process (the October 2025 session closed without agreement)Fuel/compliance credit investments calibrated to a regulatory timeline that is no longer currentView page →

Every operational page in the MARPOL Operations module includes its own "Recurring mistakes" table in a dedicated section; this page collects them all into a single searchable index.